Passing with almost no debate, this resolution has been named the Davis resolution after the man who reported it out of Committee, Henry Winter Davis, chairman of tiie House Committee on Foregin Relations.^ It is the purpose of tliis paper to demonstrate that John A. Kasson, Congressman from Iowa, was the initiator of thi.s resolution. While tlie evidence of his major role in conceiving this antiFrench resolution is clear, it is equally clear that no satisfactory explanation of his motives can be offered.
The resolution had several immediate effects. First, the French government was annoyed and angered, feeling this resolution was intended as an open challenge to her honor." Second, the Mexican government interpreted the resolution to indicate the growing swell of opinion in the United States favoring aid to President Benito Juarez In-leaguered IJberal govermnent. Thiid, the resolution was an obvious effort on the part of Radical leaders to embarrass the Lincoln-Seward administration's conduct of foreign policy. The Radicals hoped to weaken the political position of Lincoln and strengthen that of the Radical's fair-hair«! lioy, John C. Fremont, an open candidate for the Republican presidential nomination in 18ß4.'' It is in conjunction with this latter point that Kasson's action is difficult to explain.
Kasson was supposedly a strong administration supporter. Yet, Lincoln and Seward had followed a consistent policy vdth regard to the French intervention in Mexico since it began in Dec. 1861. Romero had served as charge d'affaires for Mexico from l>efore the outbreak of the Civil War imtil the spring of 1863. He resigned then, only because the Juarez government could not afford to give him sufficient funds to lobby in the politically influeneial circles of Washington. He retiniied in the fall of 1863 as Mexican Minister after assurances were given him that he would receive an adecjuate salary and an expense allowance sufficient to pennit effective lobbying on his part. He had long been convinced he WÍLS not going to achieve meaningful aid to Mexico through Seward and the normal diplomatic channels. Immediately upon his return he began to look for a house in which he could entertain the infltiential of Washington at formal dinners. Just before Christmas he rented a house, spent the next month funiishing it, ac<|uiring and training a staff, and giving trial diimers to work out any problems that might exist.* Then, on the evening of Jan. 21, 1864, Romero began earnestly to eat his way into Washington's inner political and diplomatic circles. In less than sixty days he gave sixteen formal dinner parties, thirteen of them aimed primarily at the Cabinet, the Senate and the House. Da\is and Romero had a long conversation during which Romero's passionate, glowing presentation solicited from Davis an offer to take action at the next Foreign Affairs Committee meeting. Romero's argument was tiiat tlie resolutions would make the French expedition unpopular in France, would cause Maximilian to vacillate in accepting the crown, and would animate the Mexican people to greater resistance. Romero claimed this was possible at no risk of the danger Seward and Davis claimed to fear of a strong French reaction. There was no danger, as Romero carefully explained, since, as tlie Seward-Sumner alliance controlled the Senate on matters relating to tbe United States' Mexican policy, this joint resolution would never take effect. On March 23rd, Davis infomied Romero his committee bad been approved recommendation of a substitute for Kasson's resolutions which incorporated their intent into one stinging resolution." Thus, on April 4th Romero's new political campaign for Mexico won its first major victor)' with the introduction of a resolution against French intervention in Mexico, and of course, indirectly against the Seward-Lincoln conduct of foreign relations. This resolution, the Kasson-Davis resolution, but known, nevertheless, as the Davis resolution, passed 109-0. As strong as Davis' resolution was. Romero was unhappy witli it. He was sure that Seward had somehow persuaded Davis to soften the resolution.*R omero also influenced Congressional criticism of Seward's policy in May, 1864. On the 19tli, Romero showed Davis the explanations Seward gave the French government relative to Davis' April 4th resolution as published in the Moniteur. Seward claimed the executive was sole formnlator of foreign policy and further pointed out that, since the Davis resolution was a joint resolution which tlie Senate had not approved, it was not even a valid congressional statement of policy. Davis' efforts to get political mileage out of this were to be delayed until the winter of 1864-1865 due to the recess of Congress at the lwginning of July. While their reasons for wishing the Seward-Lincoln administration to fall varied, Romero and Davis useil Seward's domestic political blunder of belittling Congress' foreign policy role for their ends. Davis, professing his belief that Congress was the chief source of popularly expressed will, thought that Seward and Lincoln were obstructing the implementation of the national will regarding French involvement in Mexico. Bebind Davis' theory of the source of sovereignty was his and his fellow Radicals' practical problem: they wanted to exercise more power and greater control over wartime and postwar reconstruction policy.'^ Romero, on the other hand, in thinking Seward was following a policy friendly to France and unfriendly to Mexico, believed that as long as Lincoln remained President, Seward would continue as architect of foreign policy.
The roles of the three, Kasson, Davis, and Romero are thus easy to describe. Kasson was tbe author of the resolution, although it may have been slightly modified in Davis' Foreign Relations Committee. Davis was the energy, the power and tilt' influence pushing the resolution through his committee and onto the floor of the House. Moreover, sincx^ Davis had a similar idea at that time, he was practically co-author. Romero was the behind-the-scenes coordinator who kept Davis informed and angry toward Seward. Thus, while the Mexican archival material permits us to understand the roles of the three individuals, and even the motivation of Davis and Romero, one great mystery remains: Why did Kasson introduce and support such a resolution? Perhaps Kasson's status as "a strong administration man" will have to be re-examined. Perhaps, also, it was merely an error, a blunder on his part. Until more evidence is produced we can only ponder the motives Kasson may have had for his seemingly illogical action during the period from Jan. 
